Virtualization-based security (VBS) and its components (such as Credential Guard and hypervisor-protected code integrity / memory integrity) are not extensible in the way described. There is no supported mechanism to “register” or host an arbitrary, custom service inside the VBS-isolated environment.
VBS creates a special, isolated execution environment (using the Windows hypervisor) that runs specific Microsoft-defined trustlets and services only. The documented services that use VBS include, for example:
- Credential Guard (LSA credential isolation) to protect NTLM, Kerberos, and other secrets
- Hypervisor-protected code integrity (HVCI, also called memory integrity) / Device Guard, which isolates the Code Integrity service from the Windows kernel
- Other Microsoft-defined isolated services such as vTPM in certain server scenarios
These components are tightly integrated with the OS and platform security features (Secure Boot, virtualization extensions, etc.) and are not designed as a general-purpose isolation framework for third-party or custom services.
Therefore:
- VBS cannot be extended to run a custom service inside its secure environment.
- The protection scope is limited to the built-in mechanisms and trustlets that Windows defines (Credential Guard, HVCI/memory integrity, and other documented isolated services).
- Custom services must use other hardening techniques (e.g., standard process isolation, code integrity policies, application control, least privilege, etc.), but they cannot themselves become VBS trustlets.
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