Nick: While CryptSvc is a key security service, the impact of this particular PR:Certificates is minor.
The HKCU...SystemCertificates\Root is one of several certificate stores used by Windows, each used for one of the various control levels Windows provides, like machine, user, process, etc. Access control and trust is a multilayered architecture. For example,
from the PowerShell ISE (console) do:
Get-ExecutionPolicy -list
to see the scope levels:
Scope ExecutionPolicy
----- ---------------
MachinePolicy Undefined
UserPolicy Undefined
Process Undefined
CurrentUser Unrestricted
LocalMachine Restricted
The HKCU...PR:Certificates list is only used if the current user (yourself) has added Root Certificate Authorities (CA), which in your case is none. In regedit, if you right-click Root, you'll see a Go to HKLM link, which is one of the other CA stores.
When Chrome tries to access a site, it polls all the CA store levels to see if they're healthy - regardless of whether they contain any certs. It's this health check of the lowest level for CurrentUser that loops because of the HKCU permissions damage (and
recovery attempts).
I don't have any specs for the PR:certificates value. I can only report what I see. I would assume the middle 16 bytes are part of the healthcheck and may include a timestamp or some other hash to verify health.
I don't have a damaged system to experiment with. Since the rebuilt PR:Certificates value worked, I didn't look into it further.