Dragon32:
Your response was right on the money. I experienced the exact same issue under similar conditions with the same results.
I assume you are using CIS (Comodo Internet Security) which altered me: 1) WuSetupV.exe was attempting to modify windowsupdate.log and 2) WUsetupV.exe was attempting to modify the following registry key: HKLM\software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\root
I denied the changes. I quickly ran into information about the Flame virus while researching this matter. Other info I found:
Virustotal.com reports the file as being safe.
The SHA1 checksum of WuSetupV.exe on my drive is: 2E3BEBEB8C62EC4035BBD115434C5ACCED99E46C
WuSetupV.exe is located at C:\Windows\SoftwareDistribution\SelfUpdate\Handler
The file is signed despite complaints by CIS that it "could not be recognized". That signature involves a certificate associated with the file that is radically different from the one involved with the original Flame virus in 2012 (which is now in everyone's untrusted certificate store: see certmgr.msc on your own computer)
I went so far as to download and install ALL of the MS-provided root certificates from this link to ensure integrity of my catalog:
I agree with the other posters on this forum: if this update is legitimate, MS should post notification of such updates in a central location before they occur so that InfoSec/IT teams can prepare-- otherwise, such security alerts will cause much wasted time in the post-Snowden age of heightened awareness. Or am I missing out on that "central location"?
PS - I didn't allow the installation of this update, and I can still successfully manually query MS servers for updates using the existing "Windows Update" control panel function on my Windows 7 x64 installation.
UPDATE TO POST:
If you don't want to trust the WuSetupV.exe file which attempts to update Windows Update, then you can download the "Windows Update" update package and install it yourself (for Windows 7 and Server 2008). I did and it worked:
In hindsight, it appears that my encounter with WuSetupV.exe had about a 99.9% change of being legitimate given the evidence. But, given the security alert coupled with the transmission method and the fact that Flame used the same transmission method (from an unwitting user's point of view), this gave me a bit of a startle until it could get sorted out.